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Who	opposes	the	EU?	Continuity	and	change	in	party
Euroscepticism	between	2014	and	2019
A	new	round	of	data	from	the	Chapel	Hill	Expert	Survey,	covering	2019,	is	due	to	be	released.	The	survey,	which
estimates	the	positions	of	political	parties	on	a	variety	of	ideological	and	policy	issues,	offers	an	invaluable	tool	for
assessing	political	competition	in	Europe.	Ryan	Bakker,	Liesbet	Hooghe,	Seth	Jolly,	Gary	Marks,	Jonathan
Polk,	Jan	Rovny,	Marco	Steenbergen,	and	Milada	Anna	Vachudova	draw	on	the	latest	data	to	examine	where
European	political	parties	now	stand	on	European	integration,	and	how	their	positions	have	changed	since	the	last
full	survey	was	conducted	in	2014.
Support	for	populist	parties	that	claim	to	defend	‘the	people’	against	the	establishment	has	risen	across	Europe	–
and	this	sentiment	appears	to	extend	to	the	European	Union	(EU).	From	the	Northern	League	in	Italy	and	the
Forum	for	Democracy	in	the	Netherlands	to	the	AfD	in	Germany,	many	populist	parties	denounce	European
integration	as	an	elitist	project	that	undermines	the	interests	of	ordinary	people	and	the	nation.
Yet	in	the	streets	and	at	the	ballot	box,	parties	and	movements	that	support	European	integration	have	also
strengthened.	During	his	successful	campaign,	French	President	Emmanuel	Macron	waved	the	European	flag	–
and	so	have	many	pro-democracy	demonstrators	on	the	streets	of	Prague	and	Warsaw.	Using	new	expert	survey
data	on	party	positions,	we	ask:	Where	do	European	political	parties	stand	on	European	integration,	and	how	have
their	positions	changed	over	the	last	five	years?
Since	1999,	the	Chapel	Hill	Expert	Survey	(CHES)	has	been	estimating	the	positions	of	political	parties	in	the
member	states	of	the	European	Union	on	a	variety	of	ideological	and	policy	issues.	With	the	newly	released	2019
data,	we	can	compare	how	parties	have	changed	their	positions	over	time.	What	we	find	is	that	parties	generally
show	limited	programmatic	flexibility.	This	is	even	the	case	for	European	integration	during	these	last	five	eventful
years:	Across	all	member	states	there	has	been,	overall,	very	little	change	between	2014	(the	date	of	our	last	full
survey)	and	2019,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.	In	2014,	the	average	party	position	was	4.93	on	a	1-7	scale,	with	higher
values	meaning	more	support	for	the	EU.	In	2019,	the	average	party	position	on	European	integration	was
substantively	indistinguishable	at	5.05.
Figure	1:	Support	for	European	integration	in	2014	and	2019
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Note:	The	boxplot	shows	the	median,	25th	and	75th	percentile	of	support	for	European	integration.	Source:	chesdata.eu
This	overall	continuity	in	party	positions	on	the	EU	is	remarkable	given	the	dynamic	nature	of	European	politics	over
this	5-year	period	that	included	both	the	refugee	crisis	in	2015	and	the	referendum	on	Britain	leaving	the	EU	in
2016.	Our	data	reveal	that	political	parties	maintained	steady	support	for	the	EU	from	2014	and	2019.	But	this	does
not	tell	the	whole	story.
‘New’	parties	are	substantially	more	Eurosceptic	than	‘old’	parties
When	we	compare	the	EU	positions	of	parties	that	are	new	to	the	2019	data	with	the	EU	positions	of	parties	that
were	also	included	in	our	2014	survey,	we	see	a	meaningful	divergence.	The	‘new’	parties	in	the	2019	data	have	a
mean	EU	position	of	4.5	while	the	‘old’	parties	have	a	mean	EU	position	of	5.2,	nearly	a	full	point	more	supportive	of
the	EU	on	the	1-7	scale.	Established	parties	thus	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	new	parties	that	challenge	the	status
quo	and	that	are	considerably	more	Eurosceptic.
Figure	2:	Old	vs.	new	party	support	for	European	integration	in	2019
Note:	The	boxplot	shows	the	median,	25th	and	75th	percentile	of	support	for	European	integration.	The	dots	represent	political
parties.	Source:	chesdata.eu
The	finding	that	new	parties	are,	on	average,	more	anti-EU	than	older	parties	is	consistent	with	the	expectation	that
party	system	change	comes	from	rising	parties	rather	than	from	established	parties	changing	their	positions.
Although	a	small	number	of	new	parties	are	ardent	proponents	of	the	EU,	most	are	Eurosceptic	challenger	parties,
such	as	the	Brexit	Party	in	the	UK	and	Vox	in	Spain.	These	challenger	parties	mobilise	support	by	criticising	the
political	establishment	–	and	that	usually	includes	the	EU.
New	parties	emphasise	anti-establishment	rhetoric
We	can	identify	the	challenger	parties	in	our	data	clearly	by	looking	at	the	salience	of	anti-establishment	rhetoric	in
the	positions	of	all	parties.
Figure	3:	Old	vs.	new	party	salience	of	anti-elite	rhetoric	in	2019
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Note:	0	=	Not	important;	10	=	Important.	The	boxplot	shows	the	median,	25th	and	75th	percentile	of	support	for	European	integration.
The	dots	represent	political	parties.	Source:	chesdata.eu
New	parties	have	an	average	anti-elite	salience	score	of	6.3,	on	a	0-10	scale,	with	10	representing	the	highest
levels	of	anti-elite	salience.	This	is	considerably	(and	statistically	significantly)	higher	than	4.0,	the	mean	for	the
older	parties.	Criticising	the	political	establishment	thus	animates	the	campaigns	of	new	parties	more	than	old
parties.
However,	as	Figure	3	shows	clearly,	there	is	plenty	of	anti-elite	sentiment	among	parties	that	were	already	in
existence	in	2014.	Indeed,	it	is	anti-elitism	–	not	whether	a	party	is	new	or	old	–	that	reveals	whether	a	party
supports	or	opposes	European	integration.	Anti-elitism	fits	Euroscepticism	like	a	glove:	the	statistical	association
between	the	two	is	a	strong	0.76.	One	is	hard	pressed	to	find	a	new	pro-European	party	that	is	also	anti-
establishment.	Of	the	17	new	parties	in	our	dataset	that	support	European	integration	(6	or	more	on	our	7-point
scale)	just	one	is	anti-elite/establishment	(6	or	more	on	the	0-10	scale).	Conversely,	of	the	eight	new	parties	that
are	strongly	Eurosceptic,	every	party	is	strongly	anti-establishment.
The	eastern	distinction
The	post-communist	states	that	have	joined	the	EU	(‘the	East’	for	short)	are	distinct	but	comparable	to	the	West.
They	are	distinct	in	that	European	integration	has	provided	an	important	anchoring	reference	for	democratic	politics
in	opposition	to	the	bloc’s	communist	authoritarian	past.	They	are	comparable	to	the	West	in	that	contemporary
politics	is	increasingly	defined	by	competition	between	anti-European	nationalism	and	pro-European
transnationalism.
In	the	East,	the	dynamics	of	opposition	to	European	integration	and	the	rise	of	new	parties	stand	out	in	three	ways.
First,	party	systems	in	the	East	are	more	organisationally	fluid	and	institutionally	weaker	than	their	western
counterparts,	which	leads	to	more	party	deaths	and	births	across	the	ideological	spectrum.	Second,	even	some
radical	nationalists	–	who	would	be	expected	strongly	to	oppose	European	integration	in	the	West	–	moderate	their
anti-EU	political	appeals	in	the	east	because	of	EU	financial	transfers	and	other	visible	benefits	of	membership.
Third,	populist	parties	that	define	‘the	people’	in	ethnic	and	religious	terms	have	won	power	in	some	states	and
engineered	significant	backsliding	to	illiberal	democracy	or	(in	Hungary)	authoritarian	rule.	In	response,	a	number	of
democratic	–	and	also	decisively	pro-European	–	political	forces	have	risen	up	to	oppose	them.	While	fragmented
and	often	eclipsed	by	populist	and	nationalist	incumbents,	these	new	parties	and	movements	use	European
integration	as	a	symbol	of	democracy.	This	has	been	reflected	in	the	growing	polarisation	of	political	competition	as
parties	oppose	one	another	across	the	nationalist-transnationalist	divide.
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This	brings	us	to	a	fundamental	difference	between	the	East	and	the	West,	as	Figure	4	makes	clear.	In	the	West,
established	‘old’	parties	are	far	more	supportive	of	European	integration	than	‘new’	parties	that	tend	to	take	anti-
establishment	stands.	In	the	East,	old	and	new	parties	are	nearly	indistinguishable	in	their	EU	positions,	with	new
challenger	parties	as	pro-European	as	the	established	parties.	In	the	East,	therefore,	anti-establishment	and	pro	EU
positions	can	go	hand	in	hand.
Figure	4:	EU	position	between	old	and	new	parties	in	eastern	Europe
Note:	The	boxplot	shows	the	median,	25th	and	75th	percentile	of	support	for	European	integration.	The	dots	represent	political
parties.	Source:	chesdata.eu
As	we	write,	Covid-19	has	shaken	European	societies	and	their	health	systems	to	the	core,	brought	economic
destruction,	and	exposed	Europe’s	fragile	solidarity.	But	Covid-19	presents	an	opportunity	as	well	as	a	challenge.
An	effective	EU	response	built	on	solidarity	may	fortify	pro-EU	opposition	forces	in	the	East	and	strengthen
established	parties	in	the	West	against	their	populist	opposition.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Contando	Estrelas	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
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